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Despite an enormous progress in the field of cognitive and computer 
sciences in recent time, the problem of adequate and computationally 
most optimal representation of human cognitive processes in artificial 
systems is still a subject of numerous disputes. As Gärdenfors noted, 
due to proper methodological structure of cognitive science, the vast 
majority of cognitive representation designs is implemented in a 
symbolic or connectionist approach [Gärdenfors, 2000]. Of course, each 
of these approaches presents a different vision of modeling techniques 
of cognitive representations. According to symbolic approach, modeling 
of cognitive processes is based on describing them in terms of 
computational operations on abstract symbols [Gärdenfors 2000: §2.2]. 
While the second approach boils down to modeling cognitive processes 
using artificial neural networks [Gärdenfors 2000: §2.3]. Despite the 
fact that – according to Gärdenfors – both approaches are 
complementary and the main difference between them lies only in the 
matter of describing differing levels of mental phenomena, both have a 
common drawback. Namely, they are unfortunately not very sensitive 
to the level of conceptual representations, which after all is one of the 
key layers of the human cognitive system. Moreover, in the case of both 
models, it is extremely difficult to provide an explanation of the genesis 
of conceptual layers, which would be in accordance with the principle 
of cognitive economy. The conceptual spaces theory developed by 
Aleksander Gemel, Tadao Ishii 
Conceptual Spaces in Object-Oriented Framework 
[2] 
Gärdenfors confronts these difficulties, providing a model of adequate 
representation of a conceptual layer structure and its genesis. 
However, this does not mean that Gärdenfors considers the 
symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches as deprived of advantages, and 
that the conceptual spaces model is kind of a theoretical competition for 
them. On the contrary, their unquestionable advantage is the ease with 
which their representations can be implemented in information 
systems demonstrating the considerable usefulness in designing 
cognitive architectures and learning systems. This feature is difficult to 
ignore since one of the main demands of cognitive science involves 
implementation of cognitive processes in a computational model of 
information processing [Gärdenfors, 2015]. Moreover, Gärdenfors’ 
proposal is intended to be a mid-level complementation of cognitive 
representational structure of human (i.e. consistent with both 
paradigms, and fully translatable into each of them). It is also vital that 
the conceptual spaces model was open to a range of wide possibilities 
of implementation, and aligned with programming languages. This text 
is devoted to the issue of this coherence. We will attempt to show that 
the middle level of mental phenomena representation in a conceptual 
spaces framework is consistent with the object-oriented programming 
paradigm. The presented solution is also appropriate for the purpose of 
representing the conceptual structure of human categories, and very 
intuitive from the perspective of artificial systems programming. 
The first part of the text is a short psychological description of 
the conceptual categorization process of humans and of the structure of 
their mental representation. The second part presents the conceptual 
spaces modeling strategy, which is in line with the psychological 
characteristics of the human cognitive apparatus. The third part 
contains a summary of the main principles of object-oriented 
programming, and aims to express the concept of cognitive domain in 
terms of classes of objects. Finally, the fourth and the fifth part are 
devoted to two implementational problems of the conceptual spaces 
framework in an object-oriented model, i.e. to the issue of the prototype 
category structure and to the problem of vagueness respectively. 
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1 Cognitive characteristics of category structure 
It is a truism to say that cognitive architecture should provide the 
possibly simplest and most intuitive methods of cognitive processes 
implementation. An even greater truism is to say that it should 
appropriately describe features of human cognition, and not impose its 
own structure in the process of modeling. In practice, however, this 
compromise between transparency of cognitive architecture and its 
structural and implementational properties is often difficult to achieve. 
Achieving it must be based on the one hand on the research results 
concerning human cognitive system, and on the other, it must rely on 
choosing the most consistent modeling technique to the structure of 
that system. Certainly, this general outline of implementation of human 
cognitive capacities also applies to the specific analysis of cognitive 
processes. This means that research on a computer model of human 
category structure should therefore also come out strictly from 
psychological analysis; it is then necessary to choose adequate and 
possibly transparent modeling techniques to address the results of this 
analysis. Within the research approach that is most optimal from an 
implementational point of view, conceptual structure of human 
categories shouldn’t be treated as a purely philosophical a priori 
construct, detached from human cognitive ability. Instead, as Rosch 
postulates, it should be constructed in accordance with the rules 
governing scientific methodology, i.e. on the basis of results of research 
and experimentation, and by taking into account the characteristics of 
the human cognitive apparatus [Rosch, 1975]. 
In the field of research on the process of categorization, this 
approach, however, is relatively new. The structure of the conceptual 
category of human has been treated, in fact, in accordance with the 
purely structuralist model for a long period of time. You can even say 
that for over two thousand years the reflection on the nature of human 
reason has been done entirely under the aegis of the so-called classical 
category theory1. The main assumption of the classical theory of 
categorization is that categories are defined by necessary and sufficient 
conditions; therefore, it is sometimes also referred to as the model of 
                                                        
1  Aristotle is considered to be the father of this theory, hence it is sometimes called 
‘Aristotelian theory of categorization’. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions (NSC). This theory was considered 
to be so evident that even a possibility of a different perspective on how 
to categorize was difficult to imagine. The situation is aptly summarized 
by Lakoff: 
“From the time of Aristotle to the later work of Wittgenstein, categories were 
thought be well understood and unproblematic. […] This classical theory was 
not the result of empirical study. It was not even a subject of major debate. It 
was a philosophical position arrived at on the basis of a priori speculation. 
Over the centuries it simply became part of the background assumptions 
taken for granted in most scholarly disciplines. In fact, until very recently, the 
classical theory of categories was not even thought of as a theory. It was 
taught in most disciplines not as an empirical hypothesis but as an 
unquestionable, definitional truth” [Lakoff, 1987]. 
In the twentieth century classical theory of categorization became 
subject to criticism. The impulse came from Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
and the experiments on categorization in the field of cognitive 
psychology conducted by Rosch and colleagues [Rosch, 1975, Mervis & 
Rosch, 1981]. In a series of experiments Rosch showed that the process 
of categorization was based on human neurophysiology and 
sensorimotor activity, that it was deeply connected with the process of 
constructing mental images and methods of organization of a memory 
material, and even that it was associated with processes of 
communication. Moreover, these studies have significantly influenced 
the scientific perception of the shape of human structure of concepts 
and categories. 
 According to the structuralist theory, construction of categories 
is determined solely by the infra-linguistic system of oppositional 
mutual relations. This means that the meaning of a unit within a system 
is determined by the place which it occupies in the language system of 
differences. A structuralist categorical outline for a sixteen-element set 
would thus look as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
5 6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 
13 14 15 16 
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Schema 1: Structuralist categorical outline. 
Given a set consisting of n elements, each element is defined as a 
conjunction of negations of other elements: 
x (x  {x,y,z,…, n}: x = y z  …  n), for n ≠ ∞ 
According to this outline, for example some specific color name in the 
color domain is therefore defined as the sum of negations of all other 
color names occurring in the system of language. Consequently, all of 
the elements of cognitive domains (e.g. colors) are equivalent (i.e. there 
are no highlighted points in the system) since only the relations to 
other components define each element. This means that the boundaries 
of every category are sharply defined as connectives of conjunction and 
negation defined in the classical two-argument logic provide for their 
demarcation. Sharp boundaries of categories reflect the unambiguity in 
defining the relationship of a given object’s membership. Relation of 
membership is therefore a “zero-one issue” in structuralist terms and – 
as befits a typical representative of the classical theory of categorization 
– is determined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. In 
consequence, this means that exactly just like there were no highlighted 
categories within a domain, there are also no highlighted elements 
within categories. Therefore, speaking of a better or worse example of 
given color (for example, ‘red’) is completely meaningless from the 
perspective of structuralism since all elements of the category are in 
fact equivalent. 
 Criticism of the classical concept of categorization has led to the 
development of the so-called prototype theory of categorization. The 
main arguments in favor of the latter have come from the results of 
psychological experiments [Rosch, 1977; Berlin & Kay 1969] which 
undermined the main assumptions of the NSC model. The experiments 
were conducted by Rosch and produced results showing clearly that the 
respondents distinguished superior and inferior members within the 
same category. In the case of NSC classification model, such 
phenomenon should not take place since the classical categorization 
process is based on common characteristics of all elements within a 
category. This change in the categorization model has also significantly 
influenced the vision of the human conceptual structure. Experimental 
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studies clearly show that for each category we can highlight central and 
peripheral elements, which differ in terms of the degree of categorical 
membership (vel. representativeness). The central element, also known 
as the prototype, is a kind of touchstone of categorical membership. 
Elements more similar to the prototype are situated closer to the center 
of the category, and characterized by a greater degree of membership, 
while those less similar to the prototype take a more peripheral 
location in the internal structure of the category. The similarity 
construed in line with the assumptions of psychology thus becomes one 
of the most important concepts in the process of constitution of the 
human conceptual structure. In short, the question of psychologically 
appropriate representation of similarity seems to be crucial not only 
from the point of view of methodology of cognitive science and 
procedures of prototype categorizing, but also from the perspective of 
cognition tout court. The only question is how to understand it. 
 Most approaches rely on cumulative model of similarity. 
According to this model, the number of common features shared with 
the prototype determines the degree of similarity to the prototype. This 
is a result of a prototype structure organization which is constituted 
with the involvement of quantitative effects of perception. As Evans 
puts it: “Prototype structure thus concerns the degree to which 
redundancy in the category members is employed in categorization, by 
virtue of providing a salient set of attributes that organize the category” 
[Evans, 2007, 176]. However, a quantitative model based on 
classification of attributes generates numerous problems. First of all, as 
it is evidenced by numerous empirical studies, a sheer amount of 
common features does not play as important role as co-occurrence of 
certain specific groups of features in the process of assessing the 
similarity. Second, the presence of such a bundle of qualities in all 
members of a particular category may be considered as a necessary and 
sufficient condition of category membership, which leads to 
transformation of the prototype theory back into the classical model. 
Thus Gärdenfors, unlike Evans, shifts towards the geometric model of 
similarity representation and conceptual structure of the mind. This 
model is an integral part of his theory of conceptual spaces, the main 
assumptions of which are discussed in the next section. 
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2 The model of conceptual structure in Gärdenfors’ conceptual 
spaces theory 
The central idea behind conceptual spaces is the belief that meaning 
can be described in terms of organized abstract spatial structures 
[Gärdenfors 2000 & 2014]. Notions used to such modeled meanings are 
then terms borrowed from geometry and vector algebra. The basic 
building blocks of every conceptual space are the so-called qualitative 
dimensions, which form a kind of theoretical framework used to set 
properties of objects and to define the relationships occurring between 
them. Dimensional reconstruction of quality is performed using a 
technique of multidimensional scaling (MDS) [on a theoretical basis for 
MDS cf. Shepard, 1962; Coombs, 1964]. The fundamental role of 
dimension in a conceptual space is representation of a wide variety of 
modeled object qualities in different cognitive domains. Therefore the 
coordinates of points within conceptual spaces represent individual 
cases of a given dimension, e.g. a certain temperature, a certain weight, 
tone, etc. Such points represent objects with specific qualities defined 
by their coordinates in space. The quality dimensions are infra-
linguistic, which means that the quality represented by them does not 
need to be expressible in the form of a language or a symbolic code. As 
Gärdenfors puts it: 
 
“Humans and other animals can represent the qualities of objects, for example 
when planning an action, without presuming an internal language or another 
symbolic system in which these qualities are expressed. As a consequence, I 
claim that the quality dimensions of conceptual spaces are independent of 
symbolic representations and more fundamental than these” [Gärdenfors 
2000: 11]. 
Gärdenfors uses the concept of dimension construed in such way to 
introduce the notion of cognitive domain, which – according to its 
conceptualization – is an integrated bundle of dimensions. Dimension is 
integrated when it necessarily occurs in conjunction with another 
integrated dimension. Examples of integrated dimensions may be, for 
instance, hue, brightness, and intensity because every representative of 
the color domain that features a specific value assigned in one 
dimension (e.g. brightness) must also have a certain value in other 
dimensions (i.e. a certain shade and intensity). The color domain as a 
three-dimensional conceptual space can be thus presented in a graphic 
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form like the one provided in Figure 1. It consists of three quality 
dimensions i.e. brightness (growing vertically bottom–up), intensity 
(growing horizontally from the center of the cone to its rims), and 
shade (changing clockwise on a circle). The most contrasting shades lie 
at opposite points of the circle. 
Figure 1: Representation of color domain in conceptual spaces model  
(Authors’ work on the basis of [Gärdenfors, 2014, p. 23]. 
Both the properties and the concepts in the conceptual space are, 
according to Gärdenfors, represented by convex sets whose layout is 
determined by the location of the prototype of a given element 
(concept/property) and the prototypes of other surrounding elements 
in a particular cognitive domain. The solution proposed by Gärdenfors 
is in line with the findings of the prototype theory of categorization 
[Rosch, 1975 & 1978; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Lakoff, 1987]. 
Representation of concepts as convex polygons in space allows for a 
more or less central location of a specific point within a given polygon. 
A central location of a point reflects prototypical characteristic of the 
object represented thereby. The prototype theory of categorization 
plays an essential part in Gärdenfors’ model because it makes it 
possible to constitute the conceptual structure of the cognitive domain. 
Mapping of the category structure of a specific domain in the model 
proposed by Gärdenfors is carried out with the aid of a topological tool 
called Voronoi tessellation. It is a method of division of n-dimensional 
space into parts, using equal distance between the highlighted points, 
which, in accordance with the arguments proposed by Gärdenfors, 
create a collection of prototypes or objects with the highest degree of 
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prominence in a given domain. Formally speaking, Voronoi tessellation 
proceeds according to the following formula: 
𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑃 (𝑝) =  {𝑥 ∈ 𝐸: ∀𝑞 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑝) ≤ 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑞)} 
In this formula, d is defined on the Euclidean space function of distance 
representing the degree of similarity between stimuli. 
For an eight-element set of points P = {p1, ..., p8} belonging to the 
Euclidean space E, the Voronoi area assigns a certain element p1 from 
the set P, which is called the set of all points that are closer to point p1 
than to any other element from P. As a result, for an 8-element set P we 
will get the following division of space: 
Figure 2: Voronoi tessellation for an 8-element set P (authors’ work). 
It is important to highlight that the model of the conceptual space 
shown in Figure 2 leaves no room for existence of borderline cases; 
borders are, in fact, decidedly sharp since they are determined by the 
function of distance between two contiguous points belonging to 
different Voronoi areas. Of course, in a natural language, a large amount 
of concepts is vague as a matter of fact. However, it is possible to 
reconcile the representation of prototype conceptual structure in 
Gärdenfors’ model with the phenomenon of vagueness, which was one 
of the major spots of concern in the classical theory of categorization. 
Let us recall that in the classical theory of categorization membership 
function is based on a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. This 
form of membership function doesn’t make it possible to grade the 
degree of membership. In the prototype theory, however, by identifying 
the membership measure with the degree of prototype resemblance, 
one can blur boundary of categories thus creating a place for border 
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cases. 
Blurring the boundaries of categories in Gärdenfors’ theory is 
possible by way of extension of its conceptual model. It involves 
multiple overlapping of tessellation (i.e. so-called cluster 
tessellation) made on the basis of vague prototypes [Douven & al. 
2013; Decock & Douven, 2014]. In other words, in the case of vague 
terms, it is more adequate to consider a set P* of clusters of points 
{{p11, …, p1n },{p21, …, p2n }, …. ,{pn1, …, pnn }} instead of a set P of 
points. Decock and Douven [2014] use the standard example of 
colors as involving such cluster modeling: color names are vague, 
and modeling the conceptual space with clusters of prototypes is 
specific to vague concepts. It is traditionally assumed that when a 
partition of a space is generated by a set P* of clusters of points, 
these clusters form circles. That is, prototypical areas are circular, as 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Voronoi Diagrams generated by P* (authors’ work on the basis 
of [Douven & al. 2013]) 
A tessellation made by a cluster of points formed in a circle (so-called 
vague prototypes) allows blurring of boundaries between concepts in a 
given space. Every point located on the boundary of two or more terms 
is considered a borderline case of these predicates. The tessellation 
formed of vague prototypes is presented in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Use of P* to model vague concepts [Decock & Douven, 2014] 
3 Object-oriented data architecture 
As we have argued in section 2 of this paper, cognitive architecture 
is supposed to be the most possibly intuitive method of cognitive 
processes implementation on the one hand, and should not impose 
its formal structure during the modeling process on the modeled 
cognitive system on the other. It seems that the key to achieve this 
goal is to select modeling techniques that will be most consistent 
with the structure of the modeled system. The approach that we 
propose in this paper, and which in our opinion is considered to be 
most consistent with Gärdenfors’ implementational model, is object-
oriented design. The greatest advantage of object-oriented 
programming, design and analysis is compatibility of such approach 
with the reality. Moreover, as research shows, human brain is 
naturally best-suited to such approach in information processing 
[Sheetz & Tegarden, 2001]. Second, object-oriented approach seems 
to be very easily reconciled with the conceptual spaces model, which 
allows very efficient and intuitive computer modeling of cognitive 
processes. 
The essential concept of object-oriented paradigm is very 
simple. The system of knowledge, or the cognitive system of 
concepts in the real world is expressed as a formal model in terms of 
objects and connections between them. Then, a model representing 
objects and their connections is mapped within a computer system. 
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The first step of this process can be called ‘modeling routine’; the 
second step is the process of simulation.  
Of course, the notion of “real world” requires some 
explanation in the context of this paper. In the case of cognitive 
architecture design, which is intended to be a reflection of the 
conceptual framework of human, the notion of “real world” applies 
to mental or conceptual reality of the mind. In fact, the concept of 
“real world” in an object-oriented methodology doesn’t necessarily 
represent an external material world, but a reality modeled by an 
object-oriented language. Therefore, in the case of our endeavor, the 
mental reality of the human categorization system is initially a 
specific model of categories with a set of certain relations assigned 
to it. In some sense we can speak about a dual modeling process. On 
the one hand, it constitutes a description of the human cognitive 
system in a conceptual spaces framework, which is subsequently 
described as a system of knowledge in terms of an object-oriented 
methodology. Simply speaking, the goal of this text is to show, that 
an object-oriented model is in line with the conceptual space 
framework. In consequence, the latter can be therefore seen as a 
first step of object-oriented implementation. The second step 
consists in translating the CS framework into a model suitable for its 
simulation in the computer system. The process of simulation itself 
is not covered by the scope of this paper. 
The basic programming unit in an object-oriented paradigm 
is not a function like in the case of procedural or functional paradigm 
(in which all computations are performed by applying functions), 
but a class representing a collection of similar real-world objects. In 
the procedural approach, the program is divided into self-contained 
and maintainable parts called ‘modules’. Every module contains 
procedures, i.e. self-contained codes that carry out single tasks. A 
function in procedural programming is a self-contained code 
returning value to the calling procedure. In consequence, the 
distinction mark of a procedural paradigm is separation of 
program’s data from instructions that manipulate it. On the 
contrary, an object-oriented paradigm binds together data and the 
instructions. The latter manipulate the former into the class. In OOP, 
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class is an encapsulated definition of a collection of similar real-
world objects. Therefore, in some way, class represents the 
conceptual category in human cognitive system. The application in 
OOP is modeled as a collection of related interacting and working 
objects. That’s why OOP is considered to be a very intuitional 
programming approach – it describes informational system as it 
exists in real life based on interactions among real objects. 
Moreover, the programming process starts with a very common 
everyday human capacity, i.e. abstraction of useful real-world 
objects and classes.  
The basic concepts of OOP are the notions of object and class. 
These two concepts are so closely connected that trying to explain 
them really seems like a chicken-and-egg dilemma. In real world it is 
impossible to define a class without using the term of object – and 
vice versa. However, in the case of OOP, the basic programming unit 
is the notion of class. Objects are always instantiations of a class. 
Due to the fact of objects being created from classes, they can be, as 
a matter of fact, distributed individually or as part of a library. 
However, it is classes that are actually pieces of a code, which means 
that they are the basic building blocks defining objects. In 
consequence, objects can be seen as merely conceptual units of both 
state and behavior. The state of an object is referred to through its 
attributes or properties, and the behavior of an object is defined by 
its set of methods. Compared to object, class can be thought of as a 
sort of higher-level data type. 
Let us note that the concept of class is in line with the notion 
of domain in Gärdenfors’ proposal. The conceptual space of a given 
cognitive domain is constructed from several quality dimensions 
connected to each other in a necessary relation. The concept of class 
in an object-oriented paradigm is easy to consider together with the 
notion of cognitive domain in a conceptual space. For instance, a 
color domain defined by three dimensions (i.e. hue, brightness, 
intensity) can be easy translated into a class of objects (colors) 
defined by these attributes. 
All the elements of a cognitive domain (for instance, specific 
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colors) represented by points in a conceptual space are instances of 
a given cognitive domain (i.e. color domain), just like objects that are 
instantiations of a given class in OO language. In other words, all the 
basic elements of both frameworks are mutually translatable. This 
applies also to values associated with objects and points. The values 
assigned to objects are in fact directly mapped to coordinates of 
points representing quality values relevant to a given class of 
attributes under consideration. However, these huge convergences 
are not sufficient to fully and naturally implement the cognitive 
process of shaping the structure of categories in an object-oriented 
language. The latter is more similar to the Aristotelian model of 
categorization rather than to the prototype one, which remains in 
accordance with Gärdenfors’ proposal. 
4 The problem of the prototype structure of an object-oriented 
language 
As we said before, since in a traditional object-oriented paradigm class 
provides an abstract definition of objects, each object has to be defined 
as an instance of its class. In other words, class defines shared data 
structures and methods for an entire collection of objects. This means 
that most object-oriented programming languages are based on the 
classic categorization model in which objects of one class are defined in 
terms of the same shared properties. Therefore, the classification model 
of an object-oriented language is essentially different from the process 
of categorization performed by humans, and includes limitations when 
it comes to implementation of conceptual spaces in an object-oriented 
framework. 
There are, however, some modifications to this classical approach, 
allowing for more flexibility in defining objects in a system. One of such 
modifications is prototype-based object-oriented programing, which in 
contrast to defining objects by class supports a more direct method of 
object creation. In prototypal object systems, objects are seen as a 
simple list of properties rather than merely instances of a class, with a 
special reference to the prototype from which they inherit their 
behavior. In other words, the fundamental difference between classical 
and prototypal object systems consists in the ontological status of a 
given object. While classical objects are defined abstractly in terms of 
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the class from which they inherit their characteristics, prototypal 
objects are defined concretely as specific objects and inherit their 
characteristics from other specific objects. Moreover, prototype-based 
languages eliminate the dual nature of information system that requires 
at least two fundamental constructs – classes and objects, and facilitate 
direct creation and manipulation of objects. They are more elegant, and 
closer to the recent cognitive theory of categorization than class-based 
languages. As Taivalsaari puts it: 
“Prototype-based languages are conceptually elegant and possess many other 
characteristics that make them appealing. These languages are also seemingly 
closer to the prototype theory presented by cognitive psychologists and 
philosophers. For instance, the ability to modify and evolve objects at the level 
of individual objects reduces the need for a priori classification and encourages 
a more iterative programming and design style. In general, when working with 
prototypes, one typically chooses not to categorize, but to exploit alikeness. 
Rather than dealing with abstract descriptions of concepts (intensions), the 
designer is faced with concrete realizations of those concepts. Consequently, 
design is driven by evaluation in the context of examples: designers run their 
solutions to evaluate them in the context of some input to the program” 
[Taivalsaari, 1997]. 
Apart from the abovementioned unquestionably practical reasons, 
prototype object-oriented systems seem to be simply ideal for modeling 
conceptual structures of categories proposed by Gärdenfors. It becomes 
even more evident when we consider the process of category structure 
creation in a prototype-based object-oriented language. This process 
refers to methods of creation of new objects. While class-based 
languages parameterize objects using templates from which other 
instances of objects are generated, prototype-based languages adopt a 
different approach to object generation. Instead of using object 
descriptions beforehand, there are stock objects generated from 
prototypes, and customized later on. The crucial feature of prototype-
based languages is the lack of an entity that represents a class of 
instances. It is the convention, or rather the resemblance, that plays the 
key part in this context.  
The so-called “cloning” is the basic mechanism used for 
instantiating prototypes in prototype-based languages. The product of a 
cloning process is something we may call a ‘field’ or ‘shallow’ copy of an 
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object, i.e. something of the same external structure of a given object. As 
a result, the clone shares attributes of the prototype, but with 
independent state values. This process is consistent with Gärdenfors’ 
model of category structure creation. Let us recall that in the case of the 
conceptual spaces model, domain is constituted by a set of a given 
prototype’s essential features, in which all particular objects 
participate, but the actual values of each object’s features are specified 
by the degree of a given object’s similarity to the prototype. Using the 
set of prototypes in a certain domain, for instance, a set of base colors in 
the domain of color [Berlin & Kay, 1966], we can easily generate the 
categorical structure of the domain similar to Voronoi division of space 
presented in Gärdenfors’ model by simply cloning objects resembling a 
given prototype. 
5 The problem of object graded membership 
The problem of the most efficient strategy for adding vagueness in an 
object-oriented data architecture is an issue well-known in formal 
literature. As Marin, Pons, and Vila have pointed out: 
„In the last few years, the object-oriented database model has been modified 
in order to incorporate vagueness. Consequently, fuzzy object-oriented 
database models have appeared. Vagueness has been studied on different 
levels: considering fuzzy attribute domains in the database, softening the idea 
of membership of an object to a class, relaxing superclass subclass 
relationships, and even trying to reflect the fuzzification in the behavior of the 
objects” [Marin, et. al. 2001, 863]. 
In order to deal with the issue of graded categorical membership, Marin 
et al. [2000] have introduced a concept of fuzzy type, and use it as a 
new way of managing fuzzy structures. Fuzzy type allows incorporating 
attributes with membership degrees determined by layers, where 
higher layers represent a greater degree of membership. Type is 
defined as a pair (S, B), where S (Structure) is the set of attributes or 
instance variables (S is the part of a set of all attributes A, i.e. S  A), 
which characterizes the structure of the type, and B (Behavior) is the 
set of methods that define its behavior. Considering the previous 
definitions, a class C is a pair (T, O), where T is the type of the class and 
O (Objects) is the set of all objects that adopt the structure and the 
behavior of a given class. Finally, similarly to the notion of a structure, 
we can define fuzzy structure as a fuzzy set defined over a set of all 
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attributes in a previous model. In consequence, fuzzy type can by 
defined as a special kind of type (S, B) whose structural part S is a fuzzy 
structure (Fuzz S, B). In other words, the key to identify fuzzy type is to 
find the membership function associated with the structural component 
of a given type. For T associated with a given class C, it adopts the 
following form: 
S: A[0,1] 
In order to make a fuzzy object-oriented model consistent with 
conceptual space and, in consequence, with cognitive capacities of the 
human mind, it is necessary to define membership function in a more 
cognitive manner, i.e. in terms of similarity to prototype. Similarity 
function can’t be expressed simply as a monotonically decreasing 
function of distance from prototype, which takes values in the real 
number interval between 0 and 1 inclusive. Function of that sort, as 
Osherson and Smith [1981] pointed out, is cognitively inadequate and 
makes wrong predictions about the conceptual structure of human 
categories. As they have shown, function of that sort can by defined as 
function c that for any prototype p, distance function d, and domain A to 
which p belongs satisfies the following condition: 
x,y  A: d(x,p) ≤ d(y,p) → c(y) ≤ c(x) 
According to Osherson and Smith, function c lacks some threshold value 
of similarity to prototype, and hence fails to specify the concept 
boundaries; this condition can be satisfied with the aid of similarity 
function M introduced by Hampton [2007, 365]. Hampton’s formal 
representation of similarity is consistent with the concept of graded 
categorical membership. Using function M, one is able to generate the 
structure of concept with determinate boundary region for 
membership and its lower and upper bounds, represented respectively 
by values SL and SH. If S (x) is the measure of similarity of x to prototype, 
and ST is the value where M equals 0.5, then M is defined as follows: 
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𝑀 (𝑥) =  
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
0                                                     if              𝑆𝐿 ≥ 𝑆(𝑥);
2  (
𝑆 (𝑥) − 𝑆𝐿    
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿
)
2
                     if    𝑆𝑇 ≥ 𝑆(𝑥) > 𝑆𝐿;
1 − 2 (
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆(𝑥)
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑆𝐿
)
2
                if   𝑆𝐻 ≥ 𝑆(𝑥) > 𝑆𝑇;
1                                                    if              𝑆(𝑥) > 𝑆𝐻.
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Function M with curved threshold between extensions and 
penumbra area [Hampton, 2007]. 
By applying Hampton’s membership function to an object-oriented 
language with three boundary regions for similarity to prototype, every 
property in the model becomes affected by the membership degree. As 
a result of such operation, we obtain a type with a fuzzy structure set 
defined over the set of all possible attributes (Figure 6). The transition 
from a classical object-oriented language to a language enriched by the 
concept of fuzzy type introduced by Marin et al. is similar to the 
abovementioned transition from Voronoi tessellation of space to cluster 
tessellation proposed by Decock & Douven [Douven & al. 2013]. 
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Figure 6: Applying fuzzy type to crisp class structure [Marin, et. al, 
2000]. 
Finally, it is important to note that besides numerous structural 
convergences between object-oriented and conceptual spaces models, 
both approaches are also highly consistent with cognitive activities of 
humans. We don’t claim that all cognitive activities are well-suited for 
both object-oriented and conceptual space approach. For instance, the 
famous Marr’s model of vision is clearly inspired by procedural 
programming languages, as long as it is considered to be: 
“...a sequence of processes that are successively extracting visual information 
from one representation, organizing it, and making it explicit in another 
representation to be used by other processes. Viewed in this way it is 
conceptually convenient to treat vision as computationally modular and 
sequential” [Mayhew & Frisby, 1984]. 
However, as Mather rightly points out, some aspects of cortical 
physiology and some cognitive activities are consistent with OOP 
models - like, for instance, object-specific priming, multiple object 
tracking, inattentional blindness, or attentional effects in motion 
perception [Mather 2001]. The model of categorical structure 
acquisition given by conceptual spaces framework seems to be also one 
of the cognitive activities well-suited for object-oriented design. We at 
least hope that we have been able to show it. Consistency of both 
models and their intuitiveness seems to create an extremely wide range 
of possibilities of implementation of Gärdenfors’ theory. 
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ABSTRACT 
CONCEPTUAL SPACES IN OBJECT-ORIENTED FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this paper is to show that the middle level of 
mental representations in a conceptual spaces framework is consistent 
with the OOP paradigm. We argue that conceptual spaces framework 
together with vague prototype theory of categorization appears to be 
the most suitable solution for modeling the cognitive apparatus of 
humans, and that the OOP paradigm can be easily and intuitively 
reconciled with this framework. First, we show that the prototype-
based OOP approach is consistent with Gärdenfors’ model in terms 
of structural coherence. Second, we argue that the product of cloning 
process in a prototype-based model is in line with the structure of 
categories in Gärdenfors’ proposal. Finally, in order to make the fuzzy 
object-oriented model consistent with conceptual space, we 
demonstrate how to define membership function in a more cognitive 
manner, i.e. in terms of similarity to prototype. 
KEYWORDS: Conceptual spaces, Object-oriented framework, prototype 
theory of categorization, vagueness, cognitive architecture. 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Przestrzenie pojęciowe, programowanie 
zorientowane obiektowo, prototypowa teoria kategoryzacji, nieostrość, 
architektura poznawcza. 
